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The ‘invisible’ hand: Views from UK institutional investors. 
 
Purpose – Investors are called to be good stewards/trustees of their investments, often on 
behalf of third parties.  In light of this fiduciary responsibility, and the conundrum of public 
criticism potentially impacting on share price, this paper uses the basis of the UK governance 
code to explore what important dialogue investors really have with their holdings to support 
good governance.  
 
Design/methodology/approach – Semi-structured telephone interviews with eight 
institutional investors explores governance issues and investor company dialogue giving 
insights in to aspects of the importance of their part in the UK corporate governance code. 
 
Findings – Rather than being sleeping lions, investors positively engage with companies, 
with regular communication being high on their agenda and not always via the AGM.  There 
is a preference to do so „hidden‟ over the glare of publicity or via share dumping.  Thus we 
often do not see their actions around their fiduciary duties as often they avoid public criticism 
or any visibility that could do reputational harm and decrease company value. 
 
Research limitations/implications – This dialogue was just pre the point of the exposure of 
the financial crisis, however it shows the importance that investors give to taking their 
responsibilities seriously.  Importantly, it provides a springboard for further debate following 
the financial crises and the updates of the financial environment.  
 
Practical implications – Even though policy seek engagement, the nuances of the investor 
dialogue are under explored compared to visible quantitative metrics.   This dialogue assures 
that investors are active, even if their engagement is not public and can be deemed as hidden. 
 
Originality/value – Complementing studies this paper explores a qualitative approach, 
uniquely sharing insights in to a hidden and little explored world of fiduciary dialogue.  
 
Keywords – Corporate governance, institutional investors, shareholder activism 
 
Paper type: Research paper 
 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
 
  
  
 
2 
The ‘invisible’ hand: Views from UK institutional investors. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Corporate governance and in particular shareholder activity has become ever more dominant 
in the press with growing interest in the shareholder vote and shareholder engagement. 
Within the UK, the UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2016)  is 
deemed to be the gold standard for „best practice‟ and listed companies are urged to either 
„comply‟ with the code or „explain‟ their governance structures accordingly.  Since its 
introduction, (the first version of „The Combined Code‟ was published in 1998 (Hampel, 
1998a, Hampel, 1998b)) studies have looked to see the level of corporate compliance and 
research shows for the UK this has been steadily rising (Conyon and Peck, 1997, Grant 
Thornton, 2007, Grant Thornton Governance Institute, 2016). There has however, been early 
years debate about the role of the institutional investor as an effective monitor of governance 
aspects of the corporate company (Jensen, 1993). The presence of institutional investors in 
the stock market is not uncommon and whilst investor forums such as the Association of 
British Insurers and the National Association of Pension Funds advocate that investors are 
proactive in their monitoring role, little has been published beyond the realms of quantitative 
studies about investors‟ actual dialogue, yet best practice documents deliver a number of 
suggestions around methods that institutional investors might use.  Recommendations such as 
voting at the AGM, shareholder proposals at meetings and engaging dialogue with the 
company should all help the investor monitor their investee companies (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2010).  Furthermore, methods showing visible engagement give a greater sense of 
monitoring, however, in practice it is only recently that the visibility of such engagement is 
being discussed.  With corporate investors acting nationally and globally, their contribution 
towards governance mechanisms is often examined in a quantitative way, thus any more 
qualitative dialogues still remain more hidden (Chung and Zhang, 2011).  For example, 
previous quantitative studies have been published examining investor activity via proxy 
statements (Bannister et al., 2011), via the annual general meeting (Rajyalakshmi, 2014) and 
dissenting votes/comments relating to specific issues (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015).  One 
such example of this would be the „say on pay‟ protests around executive compensation 
(BBC, 2017, Yeomans, 2017). 
 
The lack of understanding around actual „dialogue‟ leaves us with the constructs of what we 
know, against what might be practiced.  In relation to this, gap this paper explores the 
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following research question: How does the institutional investor actively engage with the 
companies it invests in, above and beyond document examination?  Thus this paper 
contributes to the literature by providing insights in to what is less transparent and often 
hidden from the public view for the UK.  Taking qualitative interviews, it complements what 
we know already from the objective quantitative literature around shareholder activism and 
probes into investors‟ views on what items of good governance practice they believe are 
important, effective and how they, as investors engage in this dialogue.  It further provides a 
starting point, due to the dramatic effects of the 2008/09 financial crisis for others to take 
forward in an engaging dialogue in contrast to many publications to date, which have relied 
on secondary sources to thematically analyse institutional investors activities.   Such 
questions fully remain relevant regardless of time and gives a more insightful view to the 
realities of balancing the view of institutional investors as they consider both their fiduciary 
responsibility and their consideration of any alignment to good practice in the areas of board 
composition, the separation of role of the CEO/Chairman, board independence and executive 
pay.   Views on the level and usefulness of their dialogue were sought to contribute and 
complement the more public engagement via proxy agencies and the formality of votes at the 
AGM. This included both types of communication and the reaction (and actions) of 
institutional investors when they are dissatisfied with management practices thus 
incorporating a key issues of best practice, that of engaging in a „dialogue‟ with the company.   
 
 
2 Theoretical framework 
Key to the modern floated company is the dispersed ownership of shares, with many 
investors being a minority and considered anonymous.  Since the early seminal times of Berle 
and Means (1932) society has been warned of the implication of self serving managers at the 
helm of our large corporations.    Indeed high profile cases of corporate failure such as The 
Bradford and Bingley collapse, or the fall in share prices when profit warnings are announced 
all serve to remind us of the powerful position of the executive and what can go wrong in 
terms of corporate governance failure.   In a theoretical context, much of the governance 
debate centres around agency theory which is characterized by the divorce of ownership and 
control, where the principal/agent problem arises (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  This problem 
creates a divergence between the principal (the owners of the company) and the agents 
(executives who are mangers running the company) (Fama, 1980).  However the role of the 
institutional investor can be seen in a wider perspective than just owners, particularly as the 
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extent of their ownership might have wider implications on the economic stability of the 
market and the economy of the country as a whole (Hawley and Williams, 2000).   
 
Furthermore, there are perspectives that the relationship between investors and firms has two 
differing aspects.  The first of these is in relation to their role as owners and thus have to be 
responsible to safeguard their investments (O'Barr and Conley, 1992).  The other is around 
business relationship with the firm which gives the ownership stake a different level of power 
due to being in some particular aspect dependent on the firm for business (Finkelstein, 1992).  
A resulting factor of this latter perspective is that the business relationship might lead to some 
levels of co-operation rather than monitoring (Heard and Sherman, 1987).  Thus such 
influences could pose conflicting relationships on the institutional investor (Heard and 
Sherman, 1987). 
 
According to Steele (2005), the responsibility of institutional investors to participate in 
invested companies is borne from the pressure posed by employees of companies and other 
organisations that have contributed their pension fund for investment.  However even in this 
context, institutional investor activism pre the financial crisis has been rare (Bainbridge, 
2005).  Whilst reactionary methods of simply selling shares by institutional investors rather 
than dialogue have been debated (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009, McCahery et al., 2016), 
generally this step is not encouraged and selling large shareholdings would be viewed (by 
some) as grossly irresponsible and a more responsible approach would be shareholder active 
investment.   
 
Indeed, the developments of the last 25 year of corporate governance in the UK show that it 
has always been advised to maintain a healthy shareholder/company dialogue.  Even in light 
of this, there has been some levels of dissatisfaction and debate that this has not necessarily 
happened or been taken seriously (Easterbrook and Butler, 2014, Monks and Sykes, 2002).  
There have also been reported issues within the press where attempts have been made to 
engage directly and where there are institutional investors engaging, companies have a 
tendency to perform better (Krikorian, 1991, Larcker et al., 2007). 
 
 
2.1 Institutional Investors – Visible or invisible? 
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Institutional investors can be defined as a heterogeneous group of organisations, including 
banks, public and private pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance companies who are able 
to exercise influence over companies where they hold investments (O'Barr and Conley, 
1992).  Furthermore, for the UK, the Myners Report (2001) states that institutional investors 
include occupational pension funds, insurance companies, investment trust and other 
financial institutions and the UK Stewardship Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2012a) 
adds to this by the incorporation of asset managers. Across the globe institutional investment 
has taken the largest part of equity investment in most countries due to the effect of 
globalization where capital can move freely in acquiring portfolio of investment (Solomon, 
2007).   
 
These institutions, according to Myners (2001) have dominated the equity market in the UK 
as their stake continues to grow over the years (Office for National Statistics, 2017). They 
become more and more significant in any economy as their share proportion rises and thus 
they play a role that cannot be ignored but should be recognised and valued.  Indeed Smith, 
Swan and Gallagher (2007) argue that the effectiveness of corporate governance in this 
context is dependent on institutional investors.  Whilst Myners (2004) stated that institutional 
ownership is rising at the expense of a decrease in individual share ownership, this has a 
greater positive effect on the monitoring role such large institutions are able to provide.  At 
the end of 2008, the year of this study, the UK Stock Market was valued at £1,158.4 billion 
(Office for National Statistics, 2010) even though this has seen a drop of £19,506 million - 
potentially due to the financial unrest.  On further inspection, there have been significant 
changes in ownership patterns from the mid sixties to 2008 (the year of this study).  The 
predominant growth being the ownership of UK companies by investors located around the 
world, rising from 7 per cent in 1963 to 40.5 per cent in 2008.  Gillan and Starks (2003) 
would argue this to be a positive step as foreign institutions often bring a more active 
perspective due to a lack of „local country loyalty‟,  but for the UK this has been at the cost of 
individual ownership of shares (Office for National Statistics, 2017).  In the UK individual 
ownership has decreased from 54% in 1963 to 12.8% in 2006.  There was a rise however 
between 1993 and 1994, although this increase according to Malin (2007) can be attributed to 
the privatization of public companies in the UK in the early nineties.  Of course, these are just 
pre the financial crisis, however, even though the value of UK quoted companies at the end 
of 2016 is worth a total of £2.04 trillion,  there is still the growth on shares held by financial 
institutions, up 1.5% between 2012-14, and a further 1% to 2016 (Office for National 
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Statistics, 2017)..  Generally this increase is attributed to more investment in pensions by 
individuals.  Also, contribution towards pension funds embraces a means of pooling risk 
together through collective investment and with tax advantage (exemptions from capital gain 
and income tax was an identified reason for the surge of pension investment).  These changes 
in structure are also reflected by Myners  (2001, 2004).  
 
Much of what is known to date around institution investors follows the pattern of being 
visible.  For example, many have a highly visible corporate governance profile and  Bebchuk 
et al. (2017) reminds us of the pull for such firms between a stewardship approach and 
agency perspective.  There is the call for a pathway to more long term approach, where the 
investor voice is expressed as engagement (McNulty and Nordberg, 2016) or via creating 
engagements that become more „routine‟ approach (Martin et al., 2007).  With the mix of 
policy, best practice and professional body guidance the investors involvement in governance 
has a complex perspective and can become multifaceted and dynamic (Aguilera et al., 2015).  
 
2.2 Institutional investors’ influence and their involvement in corporate governance 
According to Hellman (2005), beneficiaries expect maximum level of returns from fund 
managers, and therefore should ensure that managers of firms deliver good corporate 
governance in order to maximize shareholders value.  Furthermore, institutional investors 
have incentives to show concern for corporate governance as part of their fiduciary duty as 
they are bound by law to act in the best interest of their own investors (clients) (Black, 1990) 
and protect the investment of other peoples‟ money (Krikorian, 1991).  The price for not 
taking this on board would be considered a breach of contract with their beneficiaries (David 
and Kochhar, 1996).   David and Kochhar (1996) further point out that increased levels of 
investments by institutional investors have made it more difficult to sell off shareholdings 
without depressing the market.  Thus rather than selling shares, active participation in 
company engagement should be advocated. Whilst this might be deemed time intensive and 
perhaps costly, the rewards from a share performance point of view should also be considered 
(Atrill, 2006).  Atrill (2006) provides evidence that open dialogues can create further 
opportunities for shareholder value as this provides a means to influence the company on 
strategy and policy decisions.  However public criticism of companies by institutional 
investors is not wise as it might be damaging on the share price.  Rather than public criticism, 
institutional investors should be encouraged to participate in „focal lists‟ (a list of companies 
that are not performing up to expectations and are rated standard or poor) as a way of acting 
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on their concerns.  This type of engagement has sometimes lead to the removal of members 
of the board (Malin, 2007).  Not only is there the participation in listings, but some 
institutional investors use corporate governance rating systems to gain information, for 
example Governance Metrics International.  Governance Metrics International covers the 
analysis of ranking several countries according to their level of corporate governance. This is 
particularly relevant for the UK as the growth of international investment in companies 
occurs.  Similarly, the transparency of such lists can act as a positive encouragement for 
governments of counties to improve corporate governance practice whilst also giving 
indicators for investors as to where to invest, i.e. both from a company and a country 
perspective.  
 
Other examples of investors flexing their role as activists have been the refusal to participate 
in right issues.  Boards of directors might call for a rights issue, by issuing additional shares 
to existing shareholders in order to raise extra funds.  Keasey et al. (2005) argue that non 
participation due to governance issues can be a method of influencing the Board as it can 
become difficult for the board to run the company effectively without adequate finance.  
However, it should be noted that this method can only be used if/when there is need to raise 
funds. 
 
3 Key aspects of the UK corporate governance framework 
Corporate Governance can be defined as the mechanisms by which companies are controlled, 
directed or made accountable (Keasey et al., 1997).  Governance though can have many 
aspects in many international contexts.  This study focuses on the UK, as such; the key 
underpinning aspects of what constitutes good governance has been drawn from a UK 
context and heavily relies on the different iterations of the UK Corporate Governance Code 
(previously the Combined Code).  A word of caution must be mentioned here in that, whilst 
this is considered best practice, it does not in essence constitute a legal framework as it 
operates on a „comply or explain‟ basis, i.e. the principles of the code might not be followed 
if an alternative may be justified in particular circumstances and good governance can be 
achieved by other means (for a fuller discussion on comply or explain see Financial 
Reporting Council, 2016, Financial Reporting Council, 2012b).   This research was carried 
out at the time that the 2008 Combined Code was effective, however even though we now 
celebrate the 25 anniversary of governance codes in the UK, the above was still common 
practice then, but for consistency with the data, the following section gives an overview of 
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the key aspects that underpin this research and were main features in the Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance at that time.  
 
3.1 Board composition and structure 
All iterations of the governance code provide for every company to have a board that will 
take responsibility for the success of the company. Also the board should separate the role of 
chief executive from that of the chairman, which must not be occupied by the same 
individual. “There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company 
between the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the running of the 
company‟s business. No one individual should have unfettered powers of decision” 
(Financial Reporting Council, 2008:A2, p12.). 
 
There should be a balance between executive and non-executive directors in order to avoid an 
individual having control over board decision, the size of the board should be adequate for 
the business need of the company and also to ensure that appointment to the board is done by 
nomination committee with a succession plan in place to fill any vacancy that arises. The 
appointment of directors should be voted by shareholders in the first annual general meeting 
(AGM) and the interval between re-election should not exceed three years. Non-executive 
directors are also expected by The Code to decide the remuneration packages for executive 
directors. However, the best practice recommended by The Combine Code (2008) might be 
insufficient to guarantee good corporate governance.  Dalton and Dalton (2006) argue that 
certain issues are necessary to ensure effectiveness of the board. Such issues include 
„Independence in spirit as well as structure‟.  Indeed Bathala and Moon (1995) believe that 
institutional investors should ensure a high proportion of independent non executive directors 
to monitor management.  Similarly, Pass (2004) regards non executive directors as a  
monitoring tool, safeguarding the interest of shareholders by ensuring that executive directors 
act in a responsible way. 
 
3.2 Committees and institutional investors on executive remuneration 
All investors thought that the existing committee structures of nominations, audit and 
remuneration provided effective forums and that effective governance meant good 
proportions of non-executive directors with the correct skills on these committees.  Due to the 
growth of press coverage on executive pay around this time, this was probed further.  Pay to 
the point of this study had been steadily increasing in the UK (PWC, 2008) with the increase 
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often being attributed to the need to enhance global competition by ensuring levels of pay 
that will retain directors (Conyon, 2000).   A further area for concern to all shareholders has 
been the structure of executive pay (Allcock, 2012, Filatotchev et al., 2007) and generally 
even though compensation contracts are said to reduce agency problems between 
shareholders and managers (Fama, 1980, Fama and Jensen, 1983) pay has risen far in excess 
of inflation (Mishel and Davis, 2015).  Even the requirements to present a remuneration 
report for approval by shareholders in the annual general meeting (The Directors' 
Remuneration Report Regulations, 2002) appears to have done little to prevent such rises 
although Hendry, Sanderson, Barker and Roberts (2007) would argue that this regulation 
creates an opportunity for more shareholder activism.   Indeed in theory, equipping 
institutional investors with this right to vote should ensure more accountability from 
management (Cubbin and Leech, 1983). 
 
However, recent research is still open to debate.  For example, early research (Cosh and 
Hughes, 1997) show that institutional investors have no influence on the level of pay for 
directors, whilst others simply attribute size of the company rather than institution investors 
as being the determinant of pay levels (Dong and Ozkan, 2008).  David, Kochhar and Levitas 
(1998) concluding that investors have significance influence on directors (CEO) 
remuneration but this is linked to their business relationship status.  In pressure resistant 
institutions with no business relationship with investee companies will reduce the director‟s 
pay but increase long term benefit (share options). The increase in long term benefit tends to 
align shareholders interest in maximizing the value of the organisation. On the other hand, 
pressure sensitive institutions will support an increase in director‟s pay mainly because of 
fear of losing business relationship if they oppose it.   Strivens, Espenlaub and Walker (2007) 
further contribute to the debate establishing that the presence of large shareholdings from 
institutional investors have an impact on decreasing salaries and bonuses but not decreasing 
benefits. Also they stated a direct relationship between bonuses and performance of investee 
companies and that the institutional investors will ensure that bonuses paid to directors are 
linked with the performance of the company and thus avoid a company paying for poor 
performance. 
 
Other publications show that greater levels of shareholdings by institution investors help tie 
executive pay to performance (Almazan et al., 2005) and that there are significant and 
positive relationships between institutional investors and levels of share option grants 
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(Ozkan, 2011).   Thus the effectiveness of pay mechanisms and the contributory factors that 
institutional investors have is still open to debate. 
 
 
3.3 Institutional investors and investor / company dialogue 
The board is expected to maintain dialogue with shareholders and also to maintain 
communication with them. One of the recommendations of all versions of The UK 
Governance Code (formally the Combined Code), is that, the board of directors should 
facilitate communication with shareholders. Myners (2001) focused on the need for 
institutional investors to take an active role in monitoring underperforming companies and to 
encourage shareholders activism, and also ensuring good corporate governance. In light of 
this report proposals were made in the UK encouraging the role of institutional investors in 
using their votes, constant dialogue and interaction with the management of the firm they 
have investment in.  
 
Any such dialogue often lands at the hands of the chair or senior independent directors. Non 
executive directors are expected to communicate with major shareholders through face to 
face contact, opinion survey, brokers briefing etc.  In support of good practice, Hermes 
Pension Management Limited (2008), encourage companies to seek an honest, open and on 
going dialogue with shareholders. As part of this they desire the communication of not only 
the plans companies are pursuing but the likely financial and wider consequences of those 
plans.  
 
4 Research design 
This study used qualitative semi structured interviews, allowing the insights and perceptions 
institutional investors to be captured.   The sample for this research was created from 
following up on a quantitative piece of research where the final item on a questionnaire was 
an invitation to participate in research via an interview.  Respondents were asked to indicate 
name and contact details for such participation.   Eight UK investment companies responded 
with fund manager names and contact details, thus data are drawn from 8 telephone semi 
structured interviews with fund managers in large institutional investor companies in the 
summer of 2008.  Interviewees were advised that their comments would be records and 
transcribed, but anonymised for research purposes.  The interview questions were divided in 
to three parts.  The first part, and the most structured part of the interview was concerned 
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with general information on the particular type of institutional investor, aiming at identifying 
the volume of equity owned in the UK and which type of market they have invested, as such 
questions identifying sample descriptors, for example, „How would you categorise your 
company in terms of the type of institutional investor you are?” “What is the quantity of your 
holdings, and in what types of markets?”.  Such market categorization helps to identify the 
level of holdings in large listed companies. Furthermore, a direct question was asked “Do you 
have any type of business relationship with any of the companies you invest in?”  This was 
important to identify arguably any business relationship with their portfolio companies might 
affect objectivity in the monitoring relationship.  
 
The middle section sought to identify how institutional investors considered governance and 
what they looked for in their investment companies, which was the opening question.  Follow 
up probe questions were prepared, and these comprised main of “how important is xxx to 
you?”, for example, “how important is the separation of the CEO and Chairman role?”.  
Many of these derived from and replicate the sections of the relevant UK corporate 
governance code and the identification of good governance practices.  Items probed in the 
dialogue again were themed in to areas covering aspects of board composition/board 
independence, the separation of the role of the CEO and chairman, committee structures and 
investors‟ views on linking executive remuneration to performance. The middle section also 
asked for considered the use of their vote in shareholders meetings and the influence they 
have on any appointment of executive directors.  
 
Lastly questions around dialogue, including types and levels of communication between 
institutional investors and their portfolio companies. The aim of this part was to identify the 
level of communication that exists between institutional investors and portfolio companies 
and also to identify the level of management that institutional investors communicate with 
this section was framed by asking “How do you maintain communication with your portfolio 
companies?”.  Depending upon responses further items were asked such as “what means do 
you use to communicate with portfolio companies?”,  “how often might this be?”, “what 
level of their organisational structure does this tend to be with?”.   
Importantly this was followed up with a question probing we also sought to identify the 
reaction of institutional investors when they are dissatisfied with management practices. 
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Due to the semi-structured nature of the interviews, full transcriptions were then themed to 
incorporate the discussions against the sectional objectives of this paper.  Whilst different 
institutional investors commented in a different order, the themes were very apparent thus 
overcoming any comparability weaknesses in the inquiry of the topics covered in these 
discussions.   
 
Part one of the questions established contextual information for the investor, this gave 
context and confirmed the nature of the investor participating.  Table one below, shows this 
in light of the eight companies participating.  Unfortunately and although no identified 
companies are shown, due to the commercial sensitivity of portfolio information, some were 
not prepared to give specific details (see question examples above), but were happy to talk to 
parts two and three of the interview questions.  
 
 
Company Investor 
type 
UK 
Holdings 
£m 
FTSE100 
(%) 
FTSE 
250 
(%) 
Aim 
(%) 
Direct 
holdings 
(%) 
Indirect 
holdings 
(%) 
1 Investment 
house 
 10000-
15000 
50-60 20-30 0-10 90+  
2 Asset 
Management  
15000-
20000 
Not wishing to disclose 
3 Pension 
fund 
1000-5000 80-90  0-10 80-90 10-20 
4 Investment 
trust 
500-1000 60-70 30-40  90+  
5 Asset 
Management 
10000-
15000 
90+  10 90+  
6 Investment 
trust 
500-1000 Not wishing to disclose 
7 Other  Not wishing to disclose 
8 Other Not wishing to disclose 
 
 
 
All respondents indicated that they had no other business relationship with their investment 
companies.   
 
5. Results: What the investors said with regards to key governance factors: 
5.1 Board composition and structure 
13 
With regards to board structure and composition all companies supported effective boards.  
Company 5 and 2 highlight the importance of this “Good practice embodies the following 
key principles…an empowered and effective board and management team” [Company 5] 
“[Company 2] supports the combined code on board composition” [Company 2] however, 
the prime focus that came out was the belief in the separation of the role of Chair and CEO.  
All companies regarded this separation as vital to the role of effective corporate governance.  
The existence of a non-executive chair was seen as one of the prime ways that enabled 
companies to engage and communicate at board level.  One manager responded  
“We like to see a group separate the roles of chairman and CEO, have 
committees for remuneration, nomination and audit, have a substantial 
percentage of its board as non-execs, have a diverse board of directors, 
including women, have an ethics committee, and report at least annually on 
its [Board/ Corporate Governance] practices” [Company 1]. 
 
Another said:  
 “we will normally vote against the election of a director holding both 
positions unless a satisfactory explanation as to why these roles are 
combined and a time frame for their separation are provided and also we are 
not in favour of a chief executive going on to become chairman of the same 
company. However, if this does occur, we expect the company to consult 
major shareholders in advance and clearly set out its reasons in the next 
annual report” [Company 2]. 
 
This implies that investors are tolerant of the „comply or explain‟ notion, however lengthy 
and continual explanations of practices might be more frowned upon particularly if there is, 
in an investors eyes, no good reason.  This reinforces views from previous literature.  
 
5.2 Executive remuneration 
All companies agreed that the remuneration committee provided a vital role for lobbying with 
regards to the setting of executive pay.   Respondents believed in the importance of executive 
pay  
“because it aligns the interests of directors and shareholders [Company 6]”, “if a 
company is performing well and value is returned to the investor, then a director‟s 
remuneration is justified in being higher” [Company 1]. 
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 another believed that  
“It is right that the board should report each year in some detail its 
remuneration policy and how that policy was implemented over the year. We 
have for some time advocated that companies put the board’s remuneration 
report to shareholders for a vote at the annual general meeting” [Company 
8]. 
 
However, when it came to the use of share options and any links to performance, responses 
were more mixed.  All companies felt that giving out share options as part of pay packages 
was important, but linking pay to performance was more mixed.  Two companies remained 
neutral about the real value of this and one was quite pragmatic in their view:  
“If a company is performing well and value is returned to the investor, then a 
director’s remuneration is justified in being higher. If not, then a director’s 
pay should reflect this” [Company 1]  “Good practice embodies the flowing 
principles…..remuneration policies that reward the creation of long-term 
shareholder value through the achievement of corporate objectives” 
[Company 5]. 
 
Once company particularly stated that it felt value could be added by a dialogue with any 
remuneration consultants appointed on behalf of the Remuneration Committee.  Literature 
thought shows limited actual instances of pay reduction, however recent activity has brought 
about discussions (often within the press) about levels and receipts of bonuses.  Following 
such public pressure certain executives have chosen to forfeit their bonus awards. 
 
5.3 Investor/company dialogue 
All the respondents said that regular communication is highly important; however one 
company‟s only involvement was to receive communications and use their voting rights.  
Indeed the company only exercising voting rights never met management face to face, sent 
letters, or made telephone calls and generally use a proxy agency even though they believed 
regular communication to be important [Company 8].  As a company responsible for 
investment on behalf of others, this was quite surprising, as one would assume they would be 
more active in fully discharging their fiduciary responsibility to those that invested in them.  
Thus it is somewhat surprising that they are not overtly proactive when it comes to matters of 
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engagement, waiting to vote at an AGM might be too late to correct or object to any 
governance issues. 
 
Others were considerably more proactive with five respondents stating that they carry out 
communication with all levels of management; but only two respondents said that their 
communication was at board level, but this was with both executive and non executive 
directors.  One investor stated “we use a range of communication methods when engaging 
with companies that we hold. There is no fixed cycle…. we engage in dialogue with the 
company when [the] need arise”[Company 6].  In fact three companies considered they had 
rich levels of dialogue with face to face and telephone contract with their portfolio 
companies.  The other four companies often used emails and letters.     
 
With all companies believing open dialogue important, the question of how and how often 
this happens becomes very relevant.   Respondents replied that they preferred to 
“communicate through constructive dialogue” [Company 2], “engage directly” [Company 
3] or “keep regular communication with the management of the company” [Company 7].  
These comments relate to companies that have already been invested in, however one 
company takes action prior to investment.   
“We visit every company (several times) before investing in it on behalf of 
our shareholders. We complete a corporate governance check on companies 
as part of our quality / value rating of companies; every company in which 
we invest must pass this first hurdle of financial strength, of which corporate 
governance is a part” [Company 1]. 
 
The reasons given for regular communication was to enable them to gain an understanding on 
issues going on in the company and also to gain understanding of decisions made by 
management and also help shareholders on their voting policies.  Furthermore, regular 
communication enabled board and management to disclose useful information on company 
strategies and other corporate information that will improve transparency from management 
and thus give greater understanding of the company‟s financial position 
 
One company even stated that they are prepared to not just engage in dialogue but stated they 
“seek to encourage best practice through regular dialogue with company management and 
by fully exercising voting rights across markets”[Company 5],  similarly they expanded on 
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this “we use a range of communication methods when engaging with companies that we hold. 
There is no fixed cycle, for example in 2007 we voted on 34889 proposals at 3279 
companies” [Company 5].  In addition to this, this company stated that they would 
“endeavor to communicate why we vote against any resolution at an AGM or EGM” 
[Company 5]. 
 
This particular company was also open to the fact that they had also been proactive in 
working with regulators, industry bodies and other like minded investors to strengthen the 
regulatory environment and contribute towards the development of best practice. 
 
The final questioning was with regards to issues that cause concern and how investors really 
deal with them.  We were told that 
“There aren’t that many issues that come up requiring public criticism.  Also, 
we usually hold fairly large positions in investee companies, so we see our role 
as trying to change an organization from the inside, rather than trying to 
embarrass / criticize it from the outside” [ Company 1].   
 
6 Discussions, implications and conclusions 
The financial crisis of 2008 -2009 shows that we still have gaps in our understanding (Ahrens 
et al., 2011).  This research thus provides a foundational starting point, is at the point of the 
emerging financial crisis, and later research by McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2016) suggest 
only 63% of investors have direct discussions, and 45% of their sample held private 
discussion, only one of this studies companies appeared to be less engaging.  More 
importantly, contrary to other studies (McCahery et al., 2016, Ram, 2017), investors do not 
see their relationship with their portfolios as an exercise in document inspection or proxy 
filings, albeit this might be their initial starting point. The above all gives rise to the concept 
of the „invisibility‟ of real engagement, not merely in a fiduciary way, but in a stewardship 
way.  All said they would avoid public criticism against their invested companies, but other 
more specific comments were harder to gain.  The common practice was to address issues 
personally with face-to-face communications or telephone calls rather than perhaps more 
formally by writing.  Again the concept here could be deemed active engagement, and 
something with more astute awareness of the broader investment/stock market perspective, 
particularly as there was no suggestion that the investors in this study would primarily engage 
in share selling („visible disapproval‟) rather than use dialogue, a healthy response from the 
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perspective of any other private shareholders.  This has to be a positive step towards greater 
engagement over perhaps more remote objection, thus a true alignment with good governance 
standards.  Similarly, overtly using the AGM to propose resolutions, contrary to practices in 
the mid 1980s and 1990s (Graves et al., 2001, Logsdon and Harry, 2009), was not the chosen 
method, however all said they would use their votes to vote against items they disagreed with 
(again opening the invisible/visible debate). 
 
The reality was that only two companies were really prepared to comment any further. One 
said  
“we have contacted companies in the past concerning their poor governance 
practice, such as suspicion of fraud or refusal to take on better ESG 
[environmental, social and governance] practices” [Company 1], the other 
“we consider all corporate governance issues to be important and will raise 
these with companies.  This is in addition, to the financial and corporate 
strategy issues which the fund managers will raise with companies” [Company 
2].  
 
The implication of the above statements from the respondents is that, institutional investors 
are taking corporate governance of companies seriously. The research indicates that they are 
no longer a sleeping lion but are gaining more momentum and bite.  However it would be 
remiss of this paper not to make reference to and try to rationalise the impact of the 
subsequent developments following the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Whilst much of this 
started in the sub-prime mortgage market, the ripple effects via subsequent quantitative 
easing cannot be ignored.  
 
 
Whilst it might be argued that quantitative easing perhaps resulted in some rebalancing of 
institutional investors‟ portfolios (Breedon et al., 2012, Joyce et al., 2017), limited qualitative 
academic research prevails, giving us no real clues around anything more than those parts of 
the portfolio that might have been invested in corporate bonds.  The lack of literature around 
this poses both weaknesses of this paper but more importantly a wealth of opportunities for 
further research.  Firstly, regardless of the timeframe of the interviews, just prior to the 
financial crisis, the findings remain relevant, not necessary to assure that this might be the 
case ten years following the crisis, but to provide a unique starting premise.  Three months 
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after these interviews, the shares of the banking sector for example had been turned upside 
down by the financial crisis (Andrew and Kenny, 2012, Nurlan et al., 2016).  Whilst the 
investors held a broad portfolio, one cannot help but question whether higher or earlier levels 
of engagement as per Pergola and Verreault‟s (2009) discussions, might have in any form 
altered the way this particular event happened.  One can be assured that subsequent to this, 
there has been a growing emphasis that institutional investors could, and should, be doing 
more to ensure companies are performing well and demonstrating good shareholder value 
and good corporate governance.  Whether there are implications that prior to this they were 
not, is perhaps more sector specific and more deeply rooted in matter beyond the scope of 
this paper.  Investors take their responsibility seriously, but still have the bounds of agency 
theory and the principal/agent debate to limit them.  
 
To conclude, investors are well aware of the various options that are available to them to 
engage with and promote good corporate governance, however, what might still not be clear 
is still how proactive they are able to do this and that they are doing this well.  Their dialogue 
point to clear engagement, and obviously they wish to cover their duties to those who entrust 
them to invest, but the balance of opportunity and cost to the investee companies may have 
subsequently changed.  At the point of the study, the driving force was perhaps more industry 
based than policy driven.  Subsequent to the study, the UK launched its UK Stewardship 
Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2010) and further revised this in 2012 (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2012a).  All indicators are that this has been well received by the city 
asset managers and the proposition from the qualitative results could be that stewardship was 
high on investors‟ radar.  However what is not known now is where this sits at this time.  
Have there been lessons learned that have encouraged the institutional investors to be even 
more pro-active in effectively discharging their fiduciary duty by ensuring companies?  Only 
further research to provide comparators would be able to debate this and provide additional 
insights in the governance and agency debate.  
 
19 
References 
Admati, A. R. and Pfleiderer, P. (2009), "The "Wall Street Walk" and shareholder activism: 
Exit as a form of voice", Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22 No. 7, pp. 2645-2685. 
Aguilera, R. V., Desender, K., Bednar, M. K. and Lee, J. H. (2015), "Connecting the Dots: 
Bringing External Corporate Governance into the Corporate Governance Puzzle", 
Academy of Management Annals, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 483-573. 
Ahrens, T., Filatotchev, I. and Thomsen, S. (2011), "The research frontier in corporate 
governance", Journal of Management & Governance, Vol. 15 No. 3, pp. 311-325. 
Allcock, D. (2012), "The choice, design and strategic implications of executive incentive pay 
schemes at the time of an Initial Public Offering", Journal of General Management, 
Vol. 37 No. 4, pp. 55-70. 
Almazan, A., Hartzell, J. and Starks, L. (2005), "Active institutional shareholders and costs 
of monitoring: Evidence from executive compensation", Financial Management, Vol. 
34 No. 4, pp. 3-34. 
Andrew, R. and Kenny, C. (2012), "A review of the influence of corporate governance on the 
banking crises in the United Kingdom and Germany", Corporate Governance: The 
International Journal of Business in Society, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 215-225. 
Atrill, P. (2006). "Corporate governance", ACCA 28th March 2006, available at: 
http://www.accaglobal.com/students/publications/finance_matters/archive/2006/66/26
17215 (accessed 19 April 2010). 
Bainbridge, S. M. (2005). "Shareholder activism and institutional investors", University of 
California, Los Angeles School of Law, Economic Research Paper No.05-20, 
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=796227 (accessed 14 March 2010). 
Bannister, J. W., Newman, H. A. and Weintrop, J. (2011), "Tests for relative performance 
evaluation based on assumptions derived from proxy statement disclosures", Review 
of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Vol. 37 No. 2, pp. 127-148. 
Bathala, C. and Moon, K. (1995), "Managerial ownership, debt policy and the Impact of 
institutional holdings: An agency perspective", Financial Management, Vol. 23 No. 
3, pp. 38-50. 
BBC. (2017). "IoD: Investors need bigger say in pay", available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-39862218 (accessed 14 May 2017). 
Bebchuk, L. A., Cohen, A. and Hirst, S. (2017), "The Agency Problems of Institutional 
Investors", The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 31 No. 3, pp. 89-112. 
20 
Berle, A. and Means, G. (1932). "The Modern Corporation and Private Property", 
Macmillan, New York. 
Black, B. (1990), "Shareholder passivity re-examined", Michigan Law Review, Vol. 89 No. 3, 
pp. 520-569. 
Breedon, F., Chadha, J. S. and Waters, A. (2012), "The financial market impact of UK 
quantitative easing", Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 28 No. 4, pp. 702-728. 
Chung, K. H. and Zhang, H. (2011), "Corporate governance and institutional ownership", 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 46 No. 1, pp. 247-273. 
Conyon, M. J. (2000). "Directors pay in UK Plc's.  A guide to executive pay determination", 
Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, London. 
Conyon, M. J. and Peck, S. I. (1997), "Recent developments in UK Corporate Governance", 
in: Buxton, T., Chapman, P. and Temple, P. (eds.), Britain's Economic Performance. 
Routledge, London,  pp. 253-277. 
Cosh, A. and Hughes, A. (1997), "Executive remuneration, executive dismissal and 
institutional shareholding", International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 15 
No. 4, pp. 469-492. 
Cubbin, J. and Leech, D. (1983), "The effect of shareholding dispersion on the degree of 
control in British companies: Theory and measurement", Economic Journal, Vol. 93 
No. 370, pp. 353-369. 
Dalton, C. M. and Dalton, R. (2006), "Corporate governance best practices: the proof is in the 
process", Journal of Business Strategy, Vol. 27 No. 4, pp. 5-7. 
David, P. and Kochhar, R. (1996), "Barriers to effective corporate governance by institutional 
investors: Implications for theory and practice", European Management Journal, Vol. 
14 No. 5, pp. 457-466. 
David, P., Kochhar, R. and Levitas, E. (1998), "The effect of institutional investors on the 
level and mix of CEO compensation", The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 41 
No. 2, pp. 200-208. 
Dong, M. and Ozkan, M. (2008), "Institutional investors and director pay: An empirical study 
of UK companies", Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Vol. 18 No. 1, 
pp. 16-29. 
Easterbrook, S. and Butler, P. (2014), "Shareholder engagement: two-way, informed 
dialogue", Governance Directions, Vol. 66 No. 3, pp. 153-155. 
21 
Fama, E. F. (1980), "Agency problems and the theory of the firm", Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 88 No. 8, pp. 288-307. 
Fama, E. F. and Jensen, M. C. (1983), "Separation of ownership and control", Journal of Law 
and Economics, Vol. 26 No. 2, pp. 301-325. 
Filatotchev, I., Jackson, G., Gospel, H. and Allcock, D. (2007). "Key drivers of 'good' 
corporate governance and the appropriateness of UK policy responses", Department 
of Trade and Industry, London. 
Financial Reporting Council (2008). "The Combined Code on Corporate Governance", 
Financial Reporting Council, London. 
Financial Reporting Council (2010). "The UK Stewardship Code", Financial Reporting 
Council, London. 
Financial Reporting Council (2012a). "The UK Stewarship Code", The Financial Reporting 
Council Limited, London. 
Financial Reporting Council (2012b). "What Constitutes and Explanation Under 'Comply or 
Explain'?  Report of Discussions Between Companies and Investors", Financial 
Reporting Council, London. 
Financial Reporting Council (2016). "The UK Corporate Governance Code", The Financial 
Reporting Council, London. 
Finkelstein, S. (1992), "Power in top management teams: Dimensions, measurement, and 
validation", Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 35 No. 3, pp. 505-538. 
Gillan, S. and Starks, L. (2003), "Corporate governance, corporate ownership, and the role of 
institutional investors: a global perspective", Journal of Applied Finance, Vol. 13 No. 
2, pp. 4-22. 
Grant Thornton (2007). "Sixth FTSE 350 Corporate Governance Review 2007: Highlighting 
trends in practice", Grant Thornton, London. 
Grant Thornton Governance Institute (2016). "The Future of Governance: One Small Step", 
Grant Thornton UK LLP, UK. 
Graves, S. B., Waddock, S. and Rehbein, K. (2001), "Fad and Fashion in Shareholder 
Activism: The Landscape of Shareholder Resolutions, 1988–1998", Business and 
Society Review, Vol. 106 No. 4, pp. 293-314. 
Hampel, R. (1998a). "Committee on corporate governance: final report (Hampel Committee 
Report)", Gee Publishing, London. 
22 
Hampel, R. (1998b). "Committee on Corporate Governance: The Combined Code", Gee 
Publishing, London. 
Hawley, J. and Williams, A. (2000). "The rise of fiduciary capitalism: How institutional 
investors can make corporate America more dynamic", University of Pennsylvania 
Press, Philadelphia. 
Heard, J. and Sherman, H. (1987). "Conflicts of Interest in the Proxy Voting System", 
Investor Responsibility Research Center, Washington, DC. 
Hellman, S. (2005), "Can we expect institutional investors to improve corporate 
governance?", Scandinavian Journal of Management, Vol. 21 No. 3, pp. 293-327. 
Hendry, J., Sanderson, P., Barker, R. and Roberts, J. (2007), "Responsible ownership, 
Shareholder value and the new shareholder activism", Competition and Change, Vol. 
11 No. 3, pp. 223-240. 
Hermes Pension Management Limited (2008). "Hermes Corporate Governance Principles", 
Hermes Pension Management Limited, London. 
Jensen, M. (1993), "The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control 
systems.", Journal of Finance, Vol. 48 No. 3, pp. 831-880. 
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976), "Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency 
costs and ownership structure", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3 No. 4, pp. 
305-360. 
Joyce, M. A. S., Liu, Z. and Tonks, I. A. N. (2017), "Institutional Investors and the QE 
Portfolio Balance Channel", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 49 No. 6, 
pp. 1225-1246. 
Keasey, K., Thompson, S. and Wright, M. (1997). "Corporate governance: economic, 
management and financial issues", Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Keasey, K., Thompson, S. and Wright, M. (2005). "Corporate Governance Accountability, 
Enterprise and International Comparisons", John Wiley and Sons Ltd, Chichester. 
Krikorian, B. (1991), "Fiduciary standards: loyalty, prudence, voting proxies, and corporate 
governance", in: Sametz, A. and Bicksler, J. (eds.), Institutional Investing; 
Challenges and Responsibilities of The 21st Century. Business One Irwin, 
Homewood, IL,  pp. 257-277. 
Larcker, D., Richardson, S. and Tuna, A. (2007), "Corporate governance, accounting 
outcomes, and organizational performance.", The Accouning Review, Vol. 82 No. 4, 
pp. 963-1008. 
23 
Logsdon, J. M. and Harry, J. V. B. (2009), "Beyond the Proxy Vote: Dialogues between 
Shareholder Activists and Corporations", Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 87 No. S1, 
pp. 353-365. 
Malin, C. (2007). "Corporate Governance", Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Martin, R., Casson, P. D. and Nisar, T. M. (2007). "Investor engagement: Investors and 
management practice under shareholder value", Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
McCahery, J. A., Sautner, Z. and Starks, L. T. (2016), "Behind the Scenes: The Corporate 
Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors", The Journal of Finance, Vol. 71 
No. 6, pp. 2905-2932. 
McNulty, T. and Nordberg, D. (2016), "Ownership, Activism and Engagement: Institutional 
Investors as Active Owners", Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 
24 No. 3, pp. 346-358. 
Mishel, L. and Davis, A. (2015). "Top CEOs Make 300 Times More than Typical Workers", 
Economic Policy institute Issue Brief,  (accessed 20 October 2017). 
Monks, R. and Sykes, A. (2002). "Capitalism Without Owners Will Fail: A Policy Makers 
Guide to Reform", Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation, London. 
Myners, P. (2001). "Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review (The Myner's 
Report)", HMSO, London. 
Myners, P. (2004). "Myners principles for institutional investment decision-making: review 
of progress", HMSO, London. 
Nurlan, O., Monowar, M. and Keun, J. L. (2016), "Corporate governance, financial crises and 
bank performance: lessons from top Russian banks", Corporate Governance: The 
International Journal of Business in Society, Vol. 16 No. 5, pp. 798-814. 
O'Barr, W. M. and Conley, J. M. (1992), "Managing relationships: The culture of institutional 
investing", Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 48 No. 5, pp. 21-27. 
Office for National Statistics (2010). "Ownership of UK Shares 2008", Office for National 
Statistics, Cardiff. 
Office for National Statistics. (2017). "Net investment by UK financial institutions", available 
at: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/investmentspensionsandtrusts/timeseries/rlke/mq5 
(accessed 31 Janaury 2018). 
Ozkan, N. (2011), "CEO compensation and firm performance: An empirical investigation of 
UK panel data", European Financial Management, Vol. 17 No. 2, pp. 260-285. 
24 
Pass, C. (2004), "Corporate governance and the role of non-executive directors in large UK 
Companies: an empirical study", Corporate Governance: The International Journal 
of Business in Society, Vol. 4 No. 2, pp. 52-63. 
Pergola, T. M. and Verreault, D. A. (2009), "Motivations and potential monitoring effects of 
large shareholders", Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in 
Society, Vol. 9 No. 5, pp. 551-563. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2015). "Shareholder activism.  Who, what, when and how?", 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Delaware. 
PWC (2008). "Executive compensation review of the year 2008", PricewaterhouseCoopers 
LLP, London. 
Rajyalakshmi, K. (2014), "Shareholder Activism", Parikalpana: K I I T Journal of 
Management, Vol. 10 No. 1, pp. 23-36. 
Ram, S. (2017), "Shareholder spring and social activism: a study of 2013-2015 proxy 
filings", Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 
Vol. 17 No. 3, pp. 560-573. 
Smith, G., Swan, P. L. and Gallagher, D. R. (2007). "Institutional Investor Monitoring and 
the Structure of Corporate Boards", available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=939441. (accessed 20 March 
2010). 
Solomon, J. (2007). "Corporate Governance and Accountability", John Wiley & Sons, 
Chichester. 
Steele, M. (2005). "Time for investors to come in from the cold". Financial Times, 20 May 
2005, p.54. 
Strivens, M., Espenlaub, S. and Walker, M. (2007). "The influence of institutional investors 
over executive remuneration in the UK", available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=991590 (accessed 14 March 2016). 
The Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations (2002). HMSO, London. 
Yeomans, J. (2017). "Shareholder spring 2017: Is this the year investors win the war on CEO 
pay?", London: Telegraph Media Group Limited, available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/03/27/shareholder-spring-2017-year-
investors-win-war-ceo-pay/ (accessed 30 March 2017). 
 
